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Referendum to be held in East Tim or 
After 23 years of brutal Indonesian military occupation which has cost the lives of one third of the 
population, the people of East Timor will have the chance to decide on the future of their country in 
a Referendum conducted by the United Nations. This is an outstanding victory for the martyred peo-
ple whose resistance to Indonesian aggression has never wavered. However, the conditions under 
which the Referendum will take place are less than satisfactory. 
The Referendum will give the East Timorese a choice 
between accepting or rejecting an Indonesian offer of 
wide-ranging autonomy. Rejection will pave the way for 
East Timor to become an independent state. The agreement 
on the Referendum reached in May at talks between the 
Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers, held under 
the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, followed the 
announcement in January by President Habibie that his 
government was prepared to leave the matter of East 
Timor's future to the people themselves . Given Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas' stubborn refusal ever to countenance a 
referendum in East Timor, the act of self-determination is 
being called a 'popular consultation' . 
Soon after the accords were signed in New York on 5 
May, preparations for the Referendum began with the for-
mation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for East 
Timor or UNAMET, under Ian Martin, a former secretary-
general of Amnesty International, who has undertaken 
similar missions on behalf of the UN in Rwanda and Haiti 
and recently served as Deputy High Representative for 
Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzogovina. 
The unfurling of the UN flag in Dili on 3 June was of 
momentous significant for the people of East Timor, 
quickly followed by the gradual build-up of UN personnel 
who will consist of six hundred electoral officials, political 
advisers and technical staff, along with 284 unarmed UN 
'police advisers' coming from a large number of countries. 
UNAMET is also employing a large number of local 
Timorese staff for jobs ranging from translators and inter-
preters to drivers and office workers. The presence of UN 
officials with their vehicles teeming on the streets of Dili 
and UN helicopters bringing in supplies for the great event 
has changed the very face of East Timor. 
But things have not proceeded smoothly because of the 
activities of pro-integration militia gangs, funded, armed 
and controlled by a powerful faction within the Indonesian 
armed forces which is strongly opposed to President 
Habibie's decision. These generals are bent on sabotaging 
the Referendum, either by terrorising the people into opting 
for autonomy or, if they are unsure of securing such an 
outcome, by preventing the Referendum from taking place 
at all. These obstructionist tactics have already compelled 
the UN Secretary-General to twice postpone the registra-
tion of voters, which has pushed the ballot from 8 August 
till 21 or 22 August, or maybe even later, because of the 
unsatisfactory security situation. 
Conditional go-ahead from Kofi Annan 
Having postponed the ballot to 1ater in Migust, voter 
registration was due to commence on 13 July. However, 
there were three serious attacks on UN offices and a con-
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voy (see below) forcing another reconsideration of the 
schedule. The Indonesian authorities persisted in claiming 
that security. conditions were satisfactory and no further 
postponement was acceptable, an assessment that was at 
complete variance with the UN 's view. 
To emphasise Jakarta' s claims, a delegation of thirteen 
top-ranking cabinet ministers, including Wiranto and Ali 
Alatas, paid a one-day visit to Dili . They reiterated their 
claims about security and made noises about steps being 
taken against groups that had launched attacks on the UN. 
It was largely in response to this that Kofi Annan an-
nounced on 14 July that he would allow registration of vot-
ers to go ahead two days later. However he made this con-
ditional on 'meaningful, visible improvements .in the secu-
rity situation (being) observed in the immediate future'. 
In a letter to the UN Security Council he said that ' the 
security situation in the territory as a whole remains serious 
and there has not been time to properly asses how far re-
cent steps taken by the government would result in an im-
provement', adding that · 'violence and intimidation have 
continued to be carried out with impunity by pro-autonomy 
militias'. 
He added the proviso that halfway through the 20-day 
registration period, he would make another assessment to 
decide whether registration could continue. In other words, 
if security fails to improve, the timetable is likely to be set 
back again. 
Security arrangements deeply flawed 
At the heart of the problems dogging the process is the 
decision written into the 5 May Accords for security during 
the Referendum to be the sole responsibility of the 
Indonesian police force, POLRJ, and the failure of the 
Accords to provide for the withdrawal from East Timor of 
the Indonesian armed forces, formerly called ABRI but now 
known as the TNI 
Xanana and Horta meet again after 23 years. 
Security arrangements during the process leading up 
to the Referendum are provided for in a Memorandum by 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan which states that 
POLRI 'has sole responsibility /Qr the maintenance of law . 
and order '. As regards the TNI, it only provides for the 
'redeployment' of the Indonesian military forces without 
specifying what this means. The Memo also says that an 
urgent first step is 'bringing armed civilian groups under 
strict control and disdpline ' and that there should be 'an 
immediate ban on rallies by armed groups while ensuring 
the freedom of all groups and tendencies. .. to organise and 
conduct peaceful political activities'. In addition, and cru-
cially, the Memo cails for 'the prompt arrest and prosecu-
tion of those who incite or threaten to use violence against 
others. Jn this connection, it has been noted with concern 
that public threats have already been issued to the United 
·Nations by certain individuals. ' 
These were the stated conditions set by Kofi Annan on 
4 May, the day before the Accords were signed by Indone-
sia and Portugal. More than two months later, armed 
groups continue to terrorise the population, none of the 
many militia leaders known to have been responsible for 
killings and abuses against the population has been arrested 
and prosecuted, while threats against the UN have turned 
into actions forcing it to close down some offices and 
withdraw personnel from certain parts of East Timor. [See 
separate item.] 
According to the Agreement signed by the Portuguese 
and Indonesian foreign ministers, the Indonesian police 
must exercise 'absolute neutrality'. Developments on the 
ground show that nothing could be further from the truth . 
Indeed is surpasses understanding how the UN could have 
agreed to supervise a Referendum in East Timor in the be-
lief that the Indonesian army and police, for more than two 
decades the force in charge of the occupation of East 
Timor, could behave neutrally 
UNAMET stands firm 
From the moment the UN mission began to 
function, there have been numerous serious inci-
dents sparked by actions of the militia - killings, 
forcing inhabitants to leave their villages, wide-
spread terror - to which the UNAMET. head, Ian · 
Martin, and its spokesman, David Wimhurst, 
have responded angrily. 
In mid June, Ian Martin and other officials 
happened to be passing through Leotela, a village 
30 kms west of Dili, when they came across 
members of the Besi Merah-Putih (Red-and-
White Iron) militia dousing houses with petrol, 
assaulting an old man, and driving villagers out 
of their homes. Martin protested, the incident was 
widely reported but no one was arrested and the 
militia action was not halted. [Jakarta Post and 
Kompas, 19 June] 
In June, Eurico Guterres, head of the Aitarak 
(Thom) militia, responsible for the killing of doz-
ens of people in .Dili on 17 April, was appointed 
head of a newly-created civil defence guard in 
Dili called PAM Swakarsa, to assist the Indone-
sian police in the performance of its law and ·or-
der duties. The appointment was endorsed by Colonel 
Timbul Silaen, East Timor chief of police. The UN's David 
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Wimhurst expressed amazement, describing the appoint-
·ment as being akin to 'having a fox guarding the hen-
house'. 
Martin and Wimhurst have both vigorously condemned 
the holding of tens of thousands of villagers who have been 
driven from their homes by mi)itia gangs, stressing that 
their virtual incarceration will obstruct participation in the 
registration for the ballot. 
UNAMET under attack 
Attacks on UNAMET offices in Maliana, Bobonaro 
district, and Viqueque in late June resulted in UN person-
nel from both offices being withdrawn. The Maliana office 
was attacked by about one hundred members of the Dadu-
rus militia gang armed with sticks and rocks. The building 
was badly damaged, a UN officer was wounded and sev-
eral East Timorese who were taking shelter in the building 
were taken to hospital with serious injuries. The militias 
also attacked three nearby houses and two UN vehicles. 
[Jakarta Post, 30 June] The response from UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan was swift. He said he 'holds the Indo-
nesian government accountable for allowing such an attack 
to occur', adding that any attack on UN personnel and 
property was 'unacceptable'. UNAMET vigorously re-
jected Indonesian claims that this was a 'minor affair' and 
amounted only to a 'brawl' between pro-integration and 
pro-independence groups. 
The local police force whose duty it is to protect UN of-
fices and personnel failed to appear until well after the at-
tack had ended, even though there was a police post in the 
same street and the Maliana police headquarters was only a 
short distance away. Signs that an attack was in the offing 
had been reported to the police the night before. 
The assault on the Viqueque UN office occurred the 
following day. The office was surrounded by armed mili-
tias, shouting abuse at the UN personnel inside and threat-
ening to kill them if they remained. Seven UN officers 
were withdrawn from the town, leaving a skeleton staff of 
whom three were UN 'police advisers'. [Jakarta Post, 2 
July] 
One week later, a convoy of trucks carrying relief and 
medical personnel to thousands of internally displaced per-
sons being held in sub-districts in Liquisa district, west of 
Dili, by Besi Merah-Putih militia was attacked on its way 
back to Dili. The convoy was accompanied by two UN 
vehicles with UN personnel whose objective was to check 
on the circumstances of these people. The day before the 
convoy went on its mission, the Dili chief of police turned 
down a request from the organisers (a joint committee of 
locally-based humanitarian NGOs) to provide police pro-
tection on the spurious grounds that this would not be in 
keeping with its 'neutrality' as those to whom relief was 
being taken were deemed to be pro-independence. 
When the convoy was halted in Liquica, three of the 
trucks were commandeered by Brimob troops and the driv-
ers were ordered to drive them to a place in readiness for 
an attack on Falintil. On the way, the trucks were halted by 
militia travelling in two vehicles. The truck drivers were 
then beaten up by the militia while the Brimob troops stood 
by, doing nothing to stop the attack. 
The attack was strongly denounced by UNAMET and led 
to top-level discussions in Jakarta on the security situation 
between Ian Martin and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and 
armed forces 'commander-in-chief, General Wiranto. In an 
undisguised attempt to discredit the UN mission, allega-
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tions were made by Indonesian officials in Dili that weap-
ons were being carried in one of the UN vehicles. 
Indonesia's counter-weight to UNAMET 
To act as a powerful counterweight to UNAMET, the 
Indonesian government has set up a Task Force for the Im-
plementation of the Popular Consultation in East Timor, 
known by its Indonesian initials as P3TT. It quickly be-
came apparent that the Task Force is acting as the political 
wing of the army's fiercely pro-integration campaign. The 
key figures in the Task Force are men who are clearly part 
of the dirty war being waged by Indonesia's military intel-
ligence. Its senior security adviser is Major General Zacky 
Anwar Makarim, who until recently headed the army's 
intelligence agency, BIA, and has served for many years as 
an intelligence office in East Timor. Zacky Anwar was in 
overall charge of the militia campaign earlier this year but 
kept a low profile in those days. His position has now been 
formalised in the Task Force and he also acts as Indone-
sia's · chief liaison officer with UNAMET. This gives him 
the key role in liaising with the UN military liaison officers 
who are supposed to be 'keeping an eye' on the activities 
of the TNI. The other top-ranking army officer in the Task 
Force, almost certainly like Zacky Anwar, a Kopassus 
man, is Brig-General Glenny Kairupan who has also 
served in East Timor. 
The man who takes the lead in the Task Force's politi-
cal initiatives is Dino Patti Djalal from the Indonesian for-
eign ministry who has long been promoted as Indonesia's 
leading 'expert' on East Timor. Djalal is also believed to 
have close links with the army's intelligence agency, BIA. 
As Task Force spokesman, Djalal quickly emerged as its 
leading political heavyweight, taking the lead in levelling 
accusations against UNAMET, giving public support to the 
militia and even taking part in talks with guerrilla leaders 
in an attempt to sideline the supposedly neutral body offi-
cially set up to handle the question of disarmament. 
As the Referendum fast approaches, it is the Task Force 
that is in the forefront in Indonesia's strategy of discredit-
ing UNAMET and challenging at every turn the UN's 
well-founded doubts about Indonesia's willingness to en-
sure security for the Referendum. 
International pressure critical 
The only force that can really compel Jakarta to change 
its strategy is international pressure which must come from 
the major powers. The government in the best position to 
so this is the US administration where both houses of Con-
gress have been under tremendous pressure from the grass-
roots. The most stunning decision was a resolution adopted 
on 30 June by the US Senate and adopted by 98 - 0 calling 
for a tougher policy in support of a free and fair ballot in 
East Timor and saying it would influence future decisions 
on loans and financial assistance to Indonesia. Within days, 
the US vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was on 
the phone to Wiranto warning him of the consequences of 
failure . [Far Eastern Economic Review. 15 July] 
A week later. Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth was in Jakarta 
warning people from Wiranto down that US-Indonesia re-
lations could suffer if the violence did not end in East 
Timor. 'If the agreement falls apart. that obviously will 
have consequences and affect relations with a number of 
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The army's dirty war in East Timor 
President Habibie's decision in January this year to allow the East Timorese to choose between 
autonomy and independence prompted feverish hostility within the armed forces. A Crisis Team was 
set up under a top-ranking intelligence officer leading to the creation of well-armed militia gangs 
throughout the territory in an attempt to halt the process set in train by Habibie's decision and either 
sabotage the UN-supervised referendum or terrorise the population into accepting autonomy. 
In its initial stages, the operation was code-named Op-
erasi Sapu Jagad (Global Clean-Sweep) though the name 
has fallen into disuse perhaps because it sounds too in-
flammatory. It led to the murders of CNRT (Timorese Na-
tional Resistance Council) leaders and the enforced disso-
lution of local CNRT offices. The objectives of operation 
were: 
To obliterate the CNRT. 
To destroy the peace process and render a UN-
conducted consultation impossible. 
To render the population defenceless and demoralised 
by eliminating the organised resistance. 
Udayana commander takes the lead 
The operation is under the supervision of Udayana IX 
Military Command based in Denpasar, Bali (which covers 
East Timor) whose commander and chief-of-staff have 
been involved in organising and training the militia death 
squads. In February, Udayana commander Major-General 
Adam Damiri held a meeting in Bali of militia leaders and 
promised logistical support, including weapons for 2,000 
men. In July, Damiri convened another meeting, this time 
in Dili, to instruct those involved on the latest focus of the 
operation . Those present included Zacky Anwar, East 
Timor commander, Colonel Tono Suratman, militia leaders 
and foreign ministry officials. [The Australian, I 0 July] All 
these generals have one thing in common, they are from 
the elite commandos, Kopassus. which is playing a critical 
role in the dirty war against East Timor. 
Damiri's chief-of-staff, Brigadier-General Mahidin 
Simbolon, a former military commander in East Timor, has 
a reputation for using Timorese to terrorise Timorese. As 
long as these two men. both committed to destroying the 
resistance. remain in their present posts, peace will not re-
turn to East Timor. 
The intelligence operation was made easier because of 
the euphoria which followed Suharto ·s downfall in May 
1998, when C"\JRT branches appeared everywhere, stu-
dents waged a campaign to popularise the idea of inde-
pendence and many East Timorese working for the admini-
stration felt emboldened to express their true feelings in 
public. The operations leading up to the killings in Liquisa 
on 6 April. and the killings in Dili on 17 April were tar-
geted on these people and on Timorese who in the past few 
years have switched allegiances. and now support inde-
pendence. 
Following Habibie's 27 January decision, the CNRT 
leadership, in an effort to avoid provocation and prevent 
bloodshed, called a halt to military operations in the bush 
and to demonstrations in the cities. But this did not deter 
the militia death squads and .their ABRI backers from per-
sisting in their wave of terror. Since late January, several 
hundred Timorese have been killed and more than 50,000 
people have fled their villages and are now living as refu-
gees or 'internally displaced persons' under the control of 
the militia with the connivance of the local military. This 
does not include the death toll in places like Suai, now 
sealed off to outside observers. where up to two hundred 
people are thought to have been killed since April. The 
situation in Suai has only worsened ever since. 
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Insubordination from the top 
Following Suharto's downfall, Habibie became ABRI 
(now TNI) supreme commander, but being a civilian, he 
exerts no authority over the armed forces. Although Gen-
eral Wiranto, as Defence Minister and Commander-in-
Chief of the TNI, expressed support for Habibie's January 
initiative, his views were' soon overwhelmed by a powerful 
faction within the army composed of Timor veterans and 
people with vested interests in hanging on to East. Timor. 
According to intelligence sources in Australia and the 
US, the backing for these operations goes right to the top. 
They assert that 'the high command of the Indonesian army 
and a group of Indonesian ministers are complicit in the 
violence'. This source confirms 'beyond doubt that some 
of the most powerful elements in the Indonesian govern-
ment are determined to covertly subvert the President's 
policy'. [Australian Financial Review, 8 July] 
A number of influential retired officers like Benny 
Murdani and Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law have also 
joined forces to defy Habibie, contributing money to fi-
nance the terror campaign in East Timor. In March, there 
were reports that US$2 million (around 17 billion rupiah) 
had been supplied to finance the operations and more re-
cently, counterfeit money has been circulating in East 
Timor to pay the militias. 
No one wants to point the finger directly at General Wi-
ranto but the fact is that he has done nothing to stop the 
operation and rein in the hardliners, if indeed he is minded 
to do so. Indeed, despite irrefutable evidence of the army's 
role in arming the militias, he has repeatedly denied this. 
Wiranto is currently pre-occupied with securing the TNl's 
future role in Indonesian political affairs and seems to be 
leaving the cataclysmic developments in East Timor (as 
well as in Aceh) to the hardliners. Be that as it may, he is 
accountable as commander-in-chief for what is happening; 
he must take responsibility for the failure to dismiss offi-
cers in East Timor who have supported and taken part in 
atrocities and stands condemned for his attempt, in light of 
all the evidence to the contrary, to absolve the TN! from 
responsibility for arming and training the militias. 
Kopassus and the intelligence 
The militias who are spearheading the dirty war opera-
tion are · under the overall command of Major-General 
Zacky Anwar and operating with the support and guidance 
of hundreds of army intelligence officers. Although SGI 
(Satuan Tugas lnteligen), the force through which Kopas-
sus has operated in East Timor for many years, is said to 
have been formally dissolved, it is still present in the terri-
tory. Soldiers recognised locally as SGI operators are still 
functioning everywhere. On 10 November 1998, 400 
Kopassus Group 4 troops arrived in Kupang, West Timor. 
Group 4 is especially trained to track down and eliminate 
opponents; it was responsible for the abduction and disap-
pearance of dozens of pro-democracy activists in Indonesia 
last year. Press reports in Australia in June referred to a 
'top-secret memo from Indonesian military intelligence, 
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General Mahidin Simbolon, chief of staff of Udayana 
military command, Colonel Tono Suratman, military com-
mander of East Timor and Major-General Zacky Anwar 
who until recently headed the army 's intelligence agency, 
BIA. Zacky Anwar is the security adviser to the Indonesian 
government's Task Force (see separate item) and heads the 
team of military liaison officers to deal with the UN's team 
of military liaison officers . These positions put his presence 
in East Timor on an official footing; in the initial phase of 
the terror campaign, his visits to East Timor were under-
cover. Another key figure is Lieut-Colonel W. Nugroho, 
the Kopassus intelligence chief who according to the same 
source, has been setting up the whole operation. 
The dirty war in East Timor follows in the pattern of the 
CIA's Phoenix programme in Vietnam, aimed at eliminat-
ing not only opponents but also people who provide leader-
ship in the community. [See David Jenkins in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 8 July] 
The militias 
Prior to the dirty war campaign launched early this 
year, at least a dozen para-military groups existed in East 
Timor, attached to local garrisons. Some function as auxil-
iaries while others have long had a reputation for brutality. 
Halilintar, led by Joao Tavares (who is now known as the 
war commander of the militia), Makikit and Gada Paksi (a 
creation of Prabowo) have liaised closed with SGI. Other 
older militia groups have been given front-line roles in op-
erations against Fa/inti!, the armed wing of the resistance. 
Weapons for tlte militia groups 
The new militia death squads have brought the level of 
violence, terror and intimidation to a level unparalleled 
since the early years of the invasion. They include Besi 
Merah Putih in Liquisa, Aitarak in Dili, Dadurus in Mali-
ana, Mahidi in Ainaro, etc, etc 
BIA, to the militia saying that all supporters of independ- The militias have bandied together in a war command 
ence should be eliminated after the vote'. [Guardian called Militia Pro-Otonomi, whose ·war commander' is 
Weekly, 6 June 1999] In a statement on 31 May, Bishop Jose Tavares, leader of Halilintar, and 'deputy war com-
Belo said that one thousand intelligence officers are now mander' is Eurico Guterres, leader of Aitarak. 
operating in East Timor. There have been skirmishes and clashes between the 
As one commentator points out, Kopassus has an un- para-militaries and the militias and in one case. even a 
broken connection with East Timor stretching back to 1975 clash involving Kvpassus operators, suggesting a degree of 
and the invasion. The key Kopassus figures include Brig- hostility among militia gangs, possibly provoked by col-
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tiding interests and jealousies. Most rank-and-file members 
are unwilling recruits whose loyalty is shaky to say the 
least. There have been signs of dissent and even reports of 
assassination attempts, reflecting a level of discontent with 
the virulent nature of the militia activities. Even the most 
dedicated leaders are nothing more than proxies, acting at 
the behest of their Indonesian/TN! paymasters and could 
disintegrate if support from the top vanishes. 
Fear of a pro-independence vote 
A major thrust 0f the TNI 's dirty war is to terrorise the 
population with warnings of dire consequences should the 
consultation result in a vote in favour of independence. 
Documents are circulating in East Timor warning that a 
bloodbath will occur in the immediate aftermath of such a 
vote. The aim is clear - to terrify the population into be-
lieving that by voting for independence, they will be con-
demning East Timor to yet more horrors. One document 
warns that death-lists have been drawn up, that death 
squads will go from village to village eliminating pro-
independence activists, and that vast sums of money and 
thousands of weapons have been made available for the 
terror campaign. It is more than likely that military intelli-
gence h~ve drawn up death lists and that they are already 
being put to use. 
Such threats should not be taken lightly. Nor should the 
possibility be overlooked of a pro-autonomy vote also 
leading to a reign of terror against pro-independence activ-
ists. In any event, it is clear that an international presence 
in East Timar to safeguard security will be just as impor-
tant after the vote as it is before. 
For 32 years, the Suharto regime refined methods to se-
cure the desired voting patterns in general elections, using 
bribery, empty promises by its party, GOLKAR supported 
to the hilt by ABRI, heavy-handed pressure on local gov-
ernment officials, and the prohibition of all political activ-
ity. But nothing matches the operation currently underway 
in East Timor. Twenty-three years of brutal occupation 
have convinced the East Timorese that their future does not 
lie within the Republic and they are fiercely and almost 
unanimously pro-independence. This is why the TNI intel-
ligence operation has had to resort to such a level of bru-
tality in its dirty war. Five districts in the western part of 
East Timor are virtually under militia control making it 
difficult to see how UNAMET will be able to conduct the 
referendum there in free and fair conditions. Elsewhere, the 
killings continue and terror prevails. The aim is clear, to 
terrify the demoralised and traumatised population into 
voting against their consciences and prevent them from 
travelling to the registration centres and later to the polling 
booths to cast their votes. 
Local commanders who must be indicted 
There are a number of local commanders whose com-
plicity ~in this operation is well documented and who 
should be sacked and indicted: 
Lt Colonel Asep Kuswani, commander of Kodim 
1638/Liquisa (District Military Command 1638/Liquisa). 
Military registration number, NRP 29468 
The reign of terror in the district of Liquisa district has 
been monitored by church and human rights sources. 
Liquisa lies 50 kms west of Drli. Disturbing reports about 
army and militia violence there were circulating in Januar~ 
1999. The violence culminated in a bloodbath on 6 Apn l 
on the grounds of Liquisa Church. Lt Colonel Asep 
Kuswan i and his territorial troops were directly involved in 
the killings. (A detailed account of the atrocity by the hu-
man rights group, Yayasan HAK is available in English 
translation from TAPOL.) 
Lt. Colonel Asep Kuswani, an infantry officer, was ap-
pointed Dandim 1638/Liquisa (Military Commander 
1638/Liquisa) on 1 October 1997. The territorial structure 
under his command includes three Koramil (military sub-
district commands). 
The militia gang operating in the district for which he is 
responsible has a reputation for extreme brutality. Set up in 
January this year, Besi Merah Putih (Red-and-White Steel) 
has been involved in numerous acts of violence, terror and 
intimidation against the population throughout the district 
of Liquisa. The attack on 6 April was directed against two 
thousand evacuees from Maubara, a sub-district of Liquisa, 
who had fled the day before, following assaults on their 
villages by Besi Merah-Putih militia in a joint operation 
with local troops. The attack on the Church involved troops 
from Battalion 143 stationed in Kodim 1638, from Koramil 
Liquisa (Military Sub District Liquisa), the police, Brimob 
(police commandos) and the BMP militia. The identities of 
59 people who died during this attack have been estab-
lished while many more disappeared. This attack was 
clearly the responsibility of Lt. Colonel Asep Kuswani, the 
highest military authority in the district, without whose 
help and supervision it could never have occurred. 
With the militia firmly entrenched, Liquisa is by far the 
worst area for human rights violations in East Timor at 
present. Many thousands of East Timorese villagers are 
being held captive by the military/militia and the atmos-
phere is t'>ne of widespread fear, far removed from the calm 
environment needed to conduct the ballot on 8 August. 
Lt. Colonel Asep Kuswani should be held responsible 
for the atrocities in Liquisa, discharged from the army and 
brought to justice for his involvement in killings and the 
holding captive of thousands of Timorese. 
Lt. Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, commander of 
Kodim 1636/Maliana (Military District Command 
1636/Maliana), Military registration number, NRP 29334 · 
The Maliana district on the border with West Timor is 
another area where violations have been grave. The com-
mander, Lt. Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, hails from the 
cavalry and was appointed Dandim 1636/Maliana (Military 
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Commander 1636/Maliana) on 1 October 1997. There are 
six Koramil (military sub-district commands) under his 
command. Halilintar (' thunderbolt' ) the mil itia gang which 
is operating in this area, is known to carry standard army 
weaponry such as semi-automatic M 16s and FCNs. 
The acts of violence against the people in Maliana are 
mostly conducted by jo'int forces including Kodim troops, 
the police and Halilintar· militia. Kopassus (elite army 
commandos) have also infiltrated from West Timor and are 
part of the joint operations. There have been reports of ran-
dom shootings at houses in the Maliana district, resulting in 
deaths and injuries among the villagers. On 21 March, a 
joint action was carried out by the three forces to seal off 
the entire area, setting up road blocks around the town and 
on the Atabae-Maliana and Kailaku-Maliana roads. 
'Autonomy or Death ! ' 
In the second week of April, actions by the Halilintar 
militia reportedly led to the deaths or disappearance of sev-
enty villagers, following which, on 13 April, the car in 
which a militia leader and members were travelling, was 
attacked by members of the Fa/inti! armed resistance. A 
militia leader named Manuel Soares Gama was killed in 
the attack. Others in the car may also have been killed. In 
reprisal, Lt Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian selected five vil-
lagers at random and ordered their execution which took 
place in the home of Manuel Soares Gama .. [See report by 
Forti/as, an Indonesian support NGO, quoting Yayasan 
HAK. dated 18 April 1999.] 
Lt. Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian has been quoted by a 
source close to T APOL as openly defying President 
Habibie's policy to allow the people of East Timor to 
choose their future status in a ballot. He told this source 
that Habibie would not remain president after Indonesian 
elections in June. If he had his way, there would be no 
change in the status of East Timor. 
The situation in the Maliana district remains extremely 
grave. According to a report from senior church sources in 
Dili on 13 June, there have been persistent human rights 
violations in Lolotoi, Bobonaro. The militias are reported 
to have cut off people's ears and forced the people to eat 
them, as well as putting people live into sacks and throw-
ing them into the ocean. 
A more recently established militia called Dudurus was 
involved in an attack on the Maliana UNA MET office at 
EASTTIMOR 
the beginning of Ju ly, which led to strong protests from the 
UN in New York. 
Thi s officer should be removed from his post, arrested 
and prosecuted for his many acts of violence against the 
people of the district of Maliana. 
Lt. Colonel Muhamad Nur, military commander Kodim 
163 7/Ermera (Military District Command 163 7/Ermera). 
Military registration number NRP 29478 
Ermera is a prosperous coffee-growing area, as a result 
of which it has been difficult for the mil itary to recruit local 
people to join the mil itia. Hence, all the violence in this 
district has been perpetrated by Lt. Colonel Muhamad 
Nur' s troops. Lt. Colonel Muhamad Nur, an infantry offi-
cer, has been Dandim 1637/Ermera (Military Commander 
Ermera/1637) since 15 December 1997. His area of com-
mand includes three Koramil. 
According to press reports, a two-pronged strategy was 
adopted, to create an atmosphere of fear among the popu-
lation and then to target the local CNRT (the pro-
independence resistance umbrella) leaders. In the middle of 
April , a wave of terror. was launched by the local military. 
There was a massacre in the remote village of Talimoro. 
when at least six people were killed. The exact death toll 
could not be established as people in Ermera were fo o 
afraid to go and find out. 
Then, in the third week of April, at least seven CNRT 
leaders were killed, including local councillor Antonio da 
Lima, They were shot in cold blood by soldiers from 
Kodim 1637/Ermera, according to local church sources. 
Among the victims was village head Bartholo Borromeu 
who was held, tortured, allowed to go home, then re-
arrested · three days later. He died on 21 April after being 
systematically tortured. According to the local priest. ·Hi s 
skull was completely smashed' . The priest. Sancho 
Amaral, appealed in vain to Lt. Colonel Muhamad Nur to 
stop the atrocities. [The Observer, 25 April 1999] 
The murders in Ermera are the direct responsibility of 
Lt. Colonel Muhamad Nur and the soldiers acting on his 
orders. Lt Colonel Muhamad Nur is typical of the majority 
of Indonesian officers who are actively or passively in-
volved in the campaign of terror that is now obstructing the 
UN-sponsored peace process . He should be dismissed from 
his post, placed under arrest and brought to justice. • 
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Indonesian Police, the prodigal son 
POLRI, the Indonesian police force, has been much in the news lately. On 1 April the force was 
separated from the Indonesian armed forces (previously ABRI, now called TN/). One month later it 
was decided in New York that POLRI would be the body responsible/or the security situation before 
and during the ballot in East Timor. It is worth having a closer look at POLRJ. 
On 8 July POLRI celebrated its 53rd birthday, the same 
day that anti-riot police used excessive force against dem-
onstrators outside the building of the Election Commission. 
Twelve members of the PRO, a left-wing party, were in-
jured by rubber bullets and dozens more were beaten up 
with anti-riot gear. This is how POLRI is seen these days 
by most Indonesians. 
ill-trained and undisciplined force. Back in the Sukarno 
days, POLRI was already losing its independence, but 
when General Suharto seized power in 1965, POLRI was 
fully integrated into the armed forces. Being a police offi-
cer was comparable to being virtually impotent. In small 
cases as well as big ones, the ·average POLRI officer was 
powerless. When soldiers broke traffic regulations, no po-
lice officer would dare to give 
him a ticket, or if he tried, he 
would be beaten up in public. 
In the early seventies, the na-
tional chief of police Hoegeng 
tried unsuccessfully to assert the 
independence of the police by 
initiating a corruption case against 
Madam Suharto and was uncere-
moniously given the sack which 
was very damaging to the prestige 
of the force . 
But in last decade, the image 
of POLRI has been given a face-
lift. Facing growing dissent in the 
army, the ageing Suharto decided 
to boost the responsibilities of the 
force. It was argued that in a 
modern democratic state, the po-
l ice should be responsible for se-
curity (sic). This is what led ulti-
________ matcl_):'. tJ> t _ep_aration of POLRI from TNI, with Suharto 
In the wave of unrest and demonstrations before and 
after the fall of Suharto, it was POLRI that increasingly 
undertook the role as the force responsible for law and or-
der. This is relatively new because until recently, the force 
played second fiddle to the army on matters of law and 
order. 
The day before the anniversary, Ian Martin, the head of 
UNAMET [see separate article], flew from Dili to Jakarta 
to seek assurances from the Jakarta authorities that there 
would be drastic improvements in the security situation. So 
far, POLRI has been unable (or unwilling) to put a stop to 
the violence of the militia groups against UN staff and re-
lief workers. 
The prodigal son 
There is not much to celebrate as POLRI's reaches its 
54th birthday. POLRl's public image is one of a corrupt, 
watching from the sidelines. 
In preparation for the separation, many POLRI officers 
were trained abroad and BRJMOB, the police special com-
mandos, was greatly expanded and given tougher training 
and more advanced equipment to fit it for riot control or 
even for combat. With the exception of war zones like 
Aceh and East Timor, POLRI is now in the front line 
against demonstrators, usually tackling the situation with a 
combination of anti-riot police and BRIMOM units. 
Heavily militarised 
Immediately after the separation, the POLRI top de-
cided to change the uniform, to make the force look less 
militaristic. But separating POLRI and turning it into a dif-
ferent body of men is not as easy as changing the uniform. 
Both POLRJ and the TNI still fall under the Departmerit of 
Defence and Security with General Wiranto, the TNI 
commander, also holding the post of Minister of Defence. 
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Since POLRI has for so long been fully integrated into 
the armed forces, chief of police Roesmanhadi acknow-
ledges that 'militarism and arrogance will need to be 
phase~ out'. Se~i.or police officers also acknowledge that 
there 1s no trad1t10n of community policing in the force. 
Only when the curriculum of the police schools is drasti-
cally changed can such a tradition begin to emerge. 
. A new curriculum has been drawn up for this year and 
will be used in the seventeen police colleges and the Police 
Academy in Semarang. In the old curriculum, 60 per cent 
o~ the course was the same as in the military academy, but 
this has been cut back to 10 per cent. The force will be in-
creased in size and the seventeen colleges will open their 
doors to 11,000 new recruits while the Academy will train 
three hundred POLRI officers. 
However, Police Chief Roesmanhadi admits that it will 
take thirty years before the police force is transformed. 
'.olice lecturer~ make no secret of the difficulty of design-
ing a new curriculum. ' It is still experimental and we can 
make changes any time,' they say. 
The other dilemma is the relatively small size of the 
police. The present military-contaminated POLRI has a 
compliment of 180,000 meinbers to serve a population of 
21 ~ million. Neig~bouring countries all have much larger 
police forces, relatively speaking. This fact is been used by 
the TNI leadership to justify continuing the active role of 
the army in matters of law and order. 
POLRI in East Timor 
To meet the requirements of security for the UN ballot, 
the police force in East Timor is being increased from 
3,900 to 8,000 men, and more than half the additional men 
are BRIMOB troops, drawn from different parts of Indone-
sia. As the most militarised section of the police. its rough 
handling of the public is often compared with KOPAS-
SUS, the red berets of the army. Several thousand of these 
police commandos have arrived in the last few weeks, all 
ready for action, complete with assault rifles, riot shields 
and batons. Some observers in East Timor have noticed 
that there are KOPASSUS men re-emerging as BRIMOB. 
But so far, there has been no improvement in the security 
situation. 
As the authority charged with safeguarding security in 
East Timor, POLRI has as yet done virtually nothing to 
curb the militia groups. While they are the ones who have 
committed so many terrible abuses, not one of the militia 
leaders has been arrested. According to Indonesian law it is 
unlawful for civilians to possess or carry weapons but the 
militia are openly carrying weapons, including firearms, 
without anything being done to stop this. 
Even the East Timor police chief, Colonel Timbul Si-
laen, admits that law and order has broken down in some 
parts of East Timor. This police colonel is a typical hard-
liner, in the habit of making controversial statements. He 
took the initiative to set up a civil defence corps along the 
lines of the civil defence corps called Pam Swakarsa which 
was set up in Jakarta last year. Some analysts say that this 
is a way of giving the militia groups a quasi official per-
sona. According to the interpretation of the colonel, Pam 
Swakarsa units can function as auxiliary troops for the po-
lice; in other words, they can assist the police in maintain-
ing law and order. This might be taken one step further by 
allowing them to carry weapons in the performance of their 
police duties. 
EASTTIMOR 
But UNAMET officials have rejected the scheme and 
r~fuse to accept the Pam Swakarsa units as police auxilia-
ries. 
On paper, TN! troops will be confined to barracks, or as 
the 5 May documents require, 'redeployed', but police and 
BR/MOB officers openly admit that they will li aise closely 
with army intelligence. 
It can be argued that in many places in Indonesia, 
POLRI is genuinely trying to find its own place outside the 
TN! but in war zones like East Timor and Aceh, POLRI 
remains subservient to the military. * 
continued from back page 
Although Dita Sari is now free, several of her PRO 
comrades are still being held, including the party 's presi-
dent, Budiman Sudjatmiko, and several key members of 
PRO. 
Police still as repressive as ever 
A group of human rights NGOs has accused the Indo-
nesian police force, POLRI. of being as repressive as ever 
even though it was separated from the armed forces on 1 
April. The group of seven organisations. including the 
YLBHI, the Legal Aid Foundation, ELSAM, the Institute 
for Policy Research and Advocacy, and KONTRAS , the 
Commission for Missing People and Victims of Violence. 
said in a joint stat'ement made public in Jakarta on 1 Juh 
1999, that nothing had changed, especially the force:s 
treatment of farmers and indigenous people in land dis-
putes in rural areas . 
The NGOs said that POLRI had handled more than fift\ 
disputes in the past few months. in many parts of the cour{-
try, adding: 'A number of people \\ere killed, injured or 
arbitrarily arrested.' At least one person \\aS killed and 
eleven injured when police opened fire on hundreds of 
protesting farmers in Jember. East Java in April. A month 
later. eleven people were injured when police shot into a 
crowd of about 5,000 workers and students durina a land 
dispute in Medan, North Sumatra. [Jakarta Post . ~July] 
[The thrust of the joint statement ''as reinforced b\ the 
fact that it was issued on the \Cr) day that pol ice op.ened 
fire on a demonstration in Jakarta. as reported above.] 
Although it was announced on I April this year that 
POLRI had been officially separated from the Indonesian 
armed forces. formerly kno\\'n as .-IBRI but now called 
TN!, the force continues to be under the overall command 
of General Wiranto in his capacity as Minister of Defence 
and Security: Wiranto is concurrent!\' commander-in-chief 
of the TN!. · 
The NGOs joint statement \\as issued to coincide \\ ith 
the anniversary of the police force. The ceremom m<irkin~ 
the anniversary was presided o\·er b\' General w·iranto and 
held at the headquarters of the P~)lice l\fobik Bri~ade. 
BR!J\!OB. the unit \\hich engages in rnmbat opt:ra~ons. 
usually known as ·police commandos'. tht: most hca\ ii\ 
militarised of all the units that makt: up POI.RI. It is BRi-
1'/(~B which is playing such a prnminl.'nt rok in opl.'rations 
agamst people. not only in lndonl.'sia ~l.'ncrall) but also in 
East Timor and Aceh. * 
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Free elections after 44 years 
For the second time since the birth of the Indonesian Republic in 1945,free elections were held on 7 
June. With few exceptions, they took place in relative peace and calm. Forty-eight political pa~~ies 
contested the elections, but only a dozen parties won seats in parliament. At the moment of wr1t1ng 
the final results are still awaited but they reflect more or less predictions based oil opinion polls. ]Vo 
party will achieve a majority, which means there will be a coalition government. There are several 
scenarios regarding the composition of the country's future government. 
Organising general elections in the 
world's largest archipelago is not an easy 
task, especially if the local election com-
mittees consist of representatives from all 
the contesting parties. Many flaws and ir-
regularities were recorded by election 
watchdogs but none of them can be said to 
have affected the outcome. The long delay 
in announcing the results is more to do 
with amateurism than deliberate tampering. 
Money politics certainly played a role in 
some places but not unlike what happens in 
Thailand, Philippines or Japan with long 
parliamentary traditions. 
Huge enthusiasm 
As expected, people participated in the 
elections with great enthusiasm. For the 
majority of people, it was the first time 
they had participated in free elections. Long before pol mg 
booths opened, people were queuing to vote. 
The short period allowed for campaigning was a major 
flaw. With the exception of the major parties that could be 
sure of getting onto the front pages, the smaller parties re-
mained unknown with no chance of making an impact. 
Party programmes were hardly discussed and only on a few 
occasions did television and radio organise debates be-
tween party leaders. The voters had to cast three votes, for 
the national parliament, for the provincial assembly and for 
the district assembly. 
Comparisons with 1955 
A comparison with the elections of 1955 shows that the 
political and ideological strands that existed in 1955 are 
still alive and well despite 32 years of authoritarian rule 
Megawati, the most likely new President 
tions. More than a hundred parties participated, with four 
emerging as victors. The 1999 elections were also orderly. 
on the whole, with five parties winning substantial votes. A 
total of 462 seats were available. The PDI-P emerged as 
biggest party with 154 seats, Golkar came second with 120 
seats, while the PPP, PKB and PAN respectively gained 
59, 51 and 35 seats. Two new Muslim parties, the PBB and 
the PK, won 13 and 6 seats. In total 19 parties achieved 
seats, 7 parties will sit with a sole member in parliament. 
Continuing the tradition of the New Order, 38 seats in par~ 
liament are allocated to the armed forces (TNI), making it 
the fifth largest fraction in parliament. 
A new government in five months' time 
under Suharto. This year's elections signalled a return to a The ne~t president will be elected by the MPR, the 
plural party system but they were held under a different People's Assembly, which is not due to meet until Novem-
constitution. The 1950 constitution provided for a figure- ber at the earliest. The delayed election results means that 
head president and a prime minister as head of government the new government may not emerge until the next cen-
but the present elections were held under the authoritarian tJry. 
1945 constitution, under which the president exercises vast The MPR is a strange body, comparable perhaps onty to 
powers as well as being the head of government. China. It meets every five years to choose a president and 
In 1955, Indonesia was still a parliamentary democracy determine the broad outlines of state policy for the coming 
and the elections were orderly and aroused great expecta- five years. In the Suharto days, both DPR (the Parliament) 
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and the MPR were rubber stamps, but the new DPR and 
MPR will express the results of the elections. The MPR's 
700 members will include the 500 MPs plus 200 repre-
sentatives from the regions and functional organisations. 
Each province is entitled to five or more seats in the MPR. 
The parties that scored well in the provincial elections will 
obtain extra MPR seats,' with the military also getting a 
share as they have seats allotted to them in the provincial 
assemblies. 
The share of seats is weighted in favour of parties with 
bigger support in Jess densely populated regions. Each 
province (which still includes East Timar!) has been given 
a set number of votes per seat, with the number of votes 
being divided by the number of seats allocated. As a result, 
--------
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and the two parties that functioned more or less as decora-
tion: the POI, the nationalist federation and the PPP, the 
Muslim federation. These parties had the advantage of ex-
isting infrastructures, particularly GOLKAR. 
The PDI-P 
Megawati ' s PDl-P reaped the political harvest in the 
post-Suharto period as it was seen by the voters as the vic-
tim and opponent of Suharto. Megawati enjoys support 
from many social strata. Traditional support for Sukarno, 
Megawati ' s father, secured it a huge majority in most parts 
a seat in East Java will represent .--~-~_,,..._,,....___,.------------------
320,000 votes while in West Papua for , '/"~ (r , (/ 
instance, 77,000 votes will suffice. This ~ . / ,,......-.. /1 
places Java-based parties like the PDI-P 
and PKB at a disad\'antage. At the 
completion of the count PDl-P achieved 
34 per cent of the votes and Golkar 22 
per cent. But the seat count gives PDI-P 
only 154 seats while Golkar gets 120 
seats. 
Different scenarios 
The most likely coalition will be un-
der the POI-P's Megawati as president 
with the support of Abdurrahman Wa-
hid's PKB. There has been opposition 
among some Muslim parties to a L~-~ .. -~,.~===~~c:__::.==~-------- :-@, ,.o• ¥rr • "~'(, woman being president but this appears · •  ------~-"-.(,_. 
to be fading. Some commentators predict that PAN will 
join the coalition although its political programme differs 
on many critical issues. Such a coalition would be Java-
based and accommodative towards the military. The two 
main parties have very mainstream agendas, unwilling to 
make major changes in the near future. The dark horse is 
the TN! whose 38 seats could tip the balance, together 
with some of the 200 non-parliamentary MPR members. 
Under this scenario, GOLKAR, PAN, the PPP and the 
smaller Muslim parties would emerge as a strong parlia-
mentary opposition, a new experience for Indonesia. 
A second possibility is that Habibie will cling on as 
GOLKAR's choice for president, with support from the 
PPP and smaller parties. This is Jess likely because so 
many Indonesians in the cities see GOLKAR as a remnant 
of the Orde Baru. Although PAN leaders say they would 
never enter a coalition with Golkar, the door is not entirely 
closed. This coalition would be geographically more repre-
sentative and it would have a stronger Muslim identity. 
Golkar's chances of succeeding will increase if a large 
number of the 200 appointees are sympathetic. 
A closer look at the parties 
PEMILU =General Elections Merdeka, 12 April 1999 
of Java and Bali . But large sections of the urban poor in the 
big cities, including Jakarta and Yogya, gave her strong 
backing. It was clear from the opinion polls and the huge 
election rallies that the PDl-P was bound to be the largest 
party. 
Before the tragic events of 27 · July 1996 when the 
authorities attacked the PD! headquarters, Megawati and 
the PD! was much closer to the pro-democracy movement. 
But after the crackdown, they shifted in the direction of 
mainstream politics; long before the elections the PDI-P. 
had become a party of the status-quo. She surrounded her-
self with conservative advisors, while more radical advi-
sors were pushed aside. 
Megawati was groomed as the future president in the 
same tradition as in other parts of the world: creating a cult 
figure and avoiding difficult issues . Insofar as it touched on 
burning issues like amending the authoritarian constitution. 
federalism or the future of East Timar. it adopted a status 
quo position. Her campaign speeches were hollow, always 
ending with a nursery song. Many analysts fear she will go 
down in history alongside other women from Asian politi-
After the downfall of Suharto, scores of political parties cal dynasties like India. Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Bangladesh or 
emerged but in the selection process only 48 parties the Philippines, lacking a good track record. 
claiming a following in the different parts of the archipel- PDl-P stands for Partai Demokrasi Indonesia _ Per-
ago survived. There are several ways of categorising the juangan (Democratic Party of Indonesia - Struggle) in 
parties. One is as between the old Orde Barn parties and contrast with POI. the original party that was endorsed by 
the new ones and the other is to look at their political and Suhar1o. The POI which contested the elections but won 
ideological background, as in 1955. hardly any votes was a creation of Suharto in 1973 when 
Using the first method one can distinguish between the he forced the nationalist and Christian parties to fuse . 
three parties that existed in the Suharto period: GOLKAR. The PDl-P is the leading, arguably the sole, secular-
the ruling party often also defined as the party of the ruler nationalist party of the top five. In the eastern part of the 
TAPOL Bulletin No.153. July 1999 11 
POLITICS 
----~- -- --~--~---
archipelago, North Sulawesi, Maluku, West Papua and 
West and East Nusa Tenggara, many non-Muslim votes 
went to the PDI-P. In 1998 a dozen top-ranking Christian 
military joined the party and Major-General Theo Syafei 
(former military commander of East Timor and former 
MP) is its vice-chair. Many political analysts have doubts 
about Megawati ' s political qualities. She will need to use 
all her skills to achieve a majority in the MPR. None of the 
major parties can be regarded as solidly united. If MPs vote 
for the president in a secret ballot, it will be each one for 
him/herself, a situation in which she could gain or lose, 
depending on political wheeling and dealing. 
Golkar 
GOLKAR, a strange political animal, is a good topic 
for a PhD thesis. It used to be the political vehicle of the 
military, then Suharto ~nd his cronies decided to jump on 
the bandwagon. In the eighties it became Suharto's sole 
political vehicle while senior officers were frequently side-
lined. In the old days, GOLKAR won a 75 per cent major-
ity through rigging, money politics, and last but not least 
because of the support of KORPRI, the organisation to 
which all civil servants were obliged to belong. It was 
compulsory for KORPRI members to join GOLKAR and 
elections became a stage-managed affair. 
The post-Suharto period brought drastic changes. 
KORPRI no longer plays a role. Suharto remnants now 
play only a marginal role while the TNl said ' goodbye' 
('equal distance' from political parties is the dictum). Many 
retired officers decided to quit the party, and one wing of 
the military set up its own political party, the PKP (which 
did appallingly in the elections). Two other important sec-
tions, MKGR and Kosgoro, also quit, with the former be-
coming one of the many obscure political parties. 
The new GOLKAR has a Muslim wing and a secular 
wing, a pro-Habibie wing and an anti-Habibie wing. The 
pro-Habibie wing is more or less Muslim with a stronghold 
in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi. In ·south Sulawesi, 
Habibie's birthplace, GOLKAR emerged as the strongest 
party. GOLKAR is arguably now the largest Muslim party, 
with many votes from the two major Muslim organisations: 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 
In its early days GOLKAR had difficulties winning 
votes from Muslim voters. In the eighties, it bribed its way 
with Muslim voters, financing mosques and Muslim 
schools with government money. In the nineties this be-
came more structural, in conformity with Suharto's policy 
of endearing himself to some wings of political Islam. The 
Muslim component in the party became quite strong, right 
up to the top. The secular wing consists partly of leftovers 
from the military and some sections of the bureaucracy. 
The old GOLKAR was corporatist, even refused to call 
itself a party but the new GOLKAR remodelled itself into a 
political party. 
The general public still see GOLKAR as the political 
vehicle of the Orde Baru, but in many ways its leaders are 
more reform-minded than the PDI-P. It was practically im-
possible for the party to campaign in the urban areas of 
Java as its rallies were met with hostility. 
The best way to describe GOLKAR now is as a party 
based largely on patronage. Groups or individuals who 
backed it have done so primarily to safeguard their careers, 
down to the village. Its large share of the vote can be e~­
plained by the fact that many people voted out of habit, 
tradition or a vague loyalty. 
The PPP 
The Muslim federation PPP was a fusion of four very 
different Muslim parties. In the early seventies Suharto 
sought to emasculate political Islam through this merger. 
This remedy worked at first but in the course of time, it 
often became the only platform through which to show 
defiance towards Suharto. Till the mid-eighties, it was not 
easy for GOLKAR to defeat the _PPP in Aceh, Madura or 
in big cities like Jakarta. People saw it as their only outlet. 
The military gets automatically 38 seats in Parliament 
The emergence of new political parties created the im-
pression at first that the PPP was on the brink of collapse 
but in the event, with its nationwide spread, it managed to 
do very well. It retained, even strengthened_, its Muslim 
identity. Like GOLKAR, it attracted a number of votes 
from Muhammadiyah and the NU. The strong PPP vote 
only confirms that political Islam in Indonesia is doing well 
and growing. 
Political Islam 
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the 
world and it is more than logical that Islam will play an 
important role in politics. Ir:i the 1955 elections, four Mus-
lim parties contested the elections, Masyumi, NU, PSII and 
Perti, gaining between them 44 per cent of the votes. The 
majority vote went to secular parties, in particular to the 
nationalist PNI and the PKI, the (still banned) Communist 
Party. By contrast,_ i~ the present elections the majority of 
votes went to pohttcal Islam. While political Islam has 
grown stronger, it has become more pluralistic and diverse. 
At least nineteen parties in the recent elections had a Mus-
lim base. Some are 'open' or inclusive, like the larger PAN 
and PKB and the smaller PIO, PIB, PCD, PAY, PUMI and 
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PP. With a bit of imagination, GOLKAR can also be iden-
tified as an inclusive Muslim party. 
Others have an exclusive Muslim identity like PPP, 
PBB, PK (the larger ones) and the small PU!, Masyumi, 
PKU, PNU, PSII 1905, Masyumi Baru, PSI! and KAMI 
Most Muslim votes originate from the two major social-
religious organisations, Muhammadiyah and the NU, 
Nahdlatul Ulama, the modernist and traditionalist wings of 
Indonesian Islam. In the 1955 elections, the NU was a po-
litical party while Masyumi was seen as the political face 
of Muhammadiyah. NU became the largest Muslim party 
with Masyumi a close second. The NU base is still largely 
Javanese rural while Muhammadiyah is more urban and 
nation-wide. 
The situation is more complex nowadays. The PPP still 
gets votes from both wings plus from the smaller factions 
(PSll and Perti). The NU vote is now divided between 
GOLKAR, PPP, PKB, PNU and PKU. The Muhammadi-
yah vote is also spread. Election accords were concluded 
between eight Muslim parties, given them an extra number 
of seats. 
None of the Muslim parties support a Muslim state but 
there are differences between them. Before the elections, 
the official religious body MUI, Maje/is Umat Islam 
(Council of Islam) called on Muslims to vote Muslim, cre-
ating quite a stir, particularly among the 'open' Muslim 
parties which criticised the statement strongly. 
Some parties have played an important role in the re-
form period since Suharto's overthrow. This includes the 
PUI (Partai Umat Islam) of Deliar Noer, a well known 
opposition leader for many years. He is inspired by the way 
the Prophet Muhammad ruled Medinah in an atmosphere 
of tolerance and plurality. Other parties represent tiny seg-
ments of the two major strands, the NU and Muhammadi-
yah, and are expected to disappear. 
PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party) is 
also in the Muhammadiyah mould, and is more orthodox. It 
is run by well-known academics, most of them the off-
spring of the Masyumi. With a number of votes in the ma-
jor cities, PBB won several seats in Parliament. 
Another interesting party is Partai Keadilan (Justice 
Party) run by Muslim intellectuals most of whom have 
PhDs from the US. It projects a strong Muslim morale 
based on the Qu'ran while being very open to non-
Muslims. It has developed a strong base in many Muslim 
universities in Java. PK' s popularity among the students 
was solid enough for it to win some seats in Parliament. 
To conclude as some analysts do, that the elections 
were a heavy defeat for political Islam is highly debatable. 
The only secular party, PDl-P, won 35 percent, while the 
rest went to a broad variety of Muslim parties. In t-955 
there was diversity within Muslim politics, but there is 
greater diversity today. The open Muslim parties have 
emerged strongly while the exclusive Muslim parties are 
rather marginal. 
The PKB 
The PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National 
Awakening Party) won most NU votes. In the early eight-
ies, NU politicians became frustrated with the ~pp fede_ra-
tion and abandoned practical politics, to function outside 
the system. The NU gained a lot of respect and under the 
leadership of Abdurrachman Wahid, bett~r k~own as Gus 
Dur and many bright, young Muslim intellectuals 
POLITICS 
emerged. The emergence of political parties prompted the 
NU leadership to re-emerge on the political scene. Over the 
years, the NU's rural followers have remained loyal, se-
curing it a large number of seats. The PKB is not exactly 
like the old NU party which represented traditional Mus-
lims in Java and South Kalimantan. 
The PKB was the creation of Gus Dur, while some NU 
factions decided to set up other parties. As the PKB's name 
shows, despite its solid Muslim background, it deliberately 
avoided assuming a Muslim profile. It is an open party and 
enjoys support from non-Muslims, including Indonesian 
Chinese. 
Most PKB leaders are well known Muslim scholars 
with a strong secular outlook, in the sense of openness to-
wards other beliefs and opinions. Gus Dur is an interna-
tional figure, at ease in non-Muslim circles, including 
Christianity, Buddhism and Judaism. His openness has 
given him the image of an open, dynamic figure. 
But in domestic politics Gus Dur is often controversial. 
In the old days, he was a man of compromise. over and 
over again making overtures to those in power, including 
Suharto and the military, in the name of creating harmony. 
This disappointed many of his followers including those in 
Forum Demokrasi, a loose group of pro-democracy activ-
ists. Gus Dur's brand of pluralism also created problems. 
Some of the more traditional and rural ulamas in the NU"s 
heartland thought this was going too far and voted for the 
PPP. 
PKB is a natural ally of the PDI-P. Java-based. main-
stream politically and accommodative towards the military. 
PAN 
PAN. Partai Amanah Nasional (National Mandate 
Party) is the only new party of the four big ones. The 
chairman of PAN, Amien Rais. a PhD graduate from the 
US, is like Megawati and Gus Dur in many ways. Al-
though there are many talented people in PAN. the focus is 
mainly on Amien Rais. It is the only party of the big five 
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with a clear reform programme. Amien Rais was chair of 
Muhammadiyah which made him a well-known fi gure in 
mainstream politics. But he gradually developed a position 
of defiance to Suharto and he can be said to be the first 
mainstream politician to became an oppositionist. 
It took quite a while before the political fo rmat of PAN 
was formulated. Amien Rais was a top Muslim leader and 
the choice of a Muslim party would have been obvious but 
it became an open party with support from many non-
Muslims. PAN had a huge impact on the middle class in 
the big cities and opinion polls gave PAN a higher percent-
age than it achieved. It scored badly in rural areas where 
traditional parties managed to maintain their support. 
Most political analysts are expecting (or hoping) that 
PAN will join a coalition with PDI-P and PKB, the so-
called anti-GOLKAR coalition. But others know that 
Amien Rais will not be able to function in a government 
with Megawati and Gus Dur. PAN is strongly against Dwi 
Fungsi, the dual function of the military, he wants the 1945 
constitution to be amended and is in favour of far-reaching 
autonomy - delicate issues for the other two parties .. 
The TNI 
TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National 
Armed Forces) is not a political party but remains a formi-
dable political force. In April its name reverted from ABRI 
to the TNI, its original name. Discussing Indonesian poli-
tics without talking about the TN! is like ignoring realities. 
General Wiranto, the TNI commander and concurrently 
Minister of Defence cannot be ignored. Most analysts 
know that reform and democratisation can never succeed 
unless the military give up their political powers. 
Prior to Suharto's downfall, TNI's popularity was at its 
lowest. TNI officers were involved in kidnapping and kill-
ing activists while nothing was done to prevent the looting 
of shops and the raping of women. TNI was unfit, its 
troops were poorly paid, undisciplined and demoralised 
and its officers were caught up in web of patronage around 
Suharto. The time had come to push TNI back to the bar-
racks and the top brass expressed a willingness to recon-
sider several of its doctrines and policies. 
There are many dimensions to TNI in politics. In gen-
eral, TNI's involvement in politics is called Dwi Fungsi, 
which justifies the military's role in society. One aspect is 
fungsi kekaryaan, functional duty or in plain English, the 
thousands of active duty officers holding jobs in the civil-
ian administration. This goes from top (cabinet ministers) 
to bottom (village heads). In the recent reformasi, the TNI 
top decided to cut back the kekaryaan jobs and 3,000 ac-
tive military had to choose between holding their civilian 
jobs or remaining in the TNI. This was an important step 
towards strengthening civil society. 
Another more difficult angle of Dwi Fungsi is the ter-
ritorial structure of the army which also goes from top to 
bottom. This structure is often described as a shadow gov-
ernment and it is a fact that local district chiefs or village 
heads have less political clout than the territorial officer. 
Still worse, the territorial officer often becomes so power-
ful that he becomes the successor of the civilian adminis-
trator. So far, this military stranglehold is untouched al-
though grassroots actions in 1998 forced dozens of military 
district chiefs and village heads to quit.. 
At the top, the military are still the determining .factor. 
In the old Parl iament, there was a fierce battle, which re-
sulted in the TNl retaining 38 seats, which is as large as the 
third largest party, the PPP, which won millions of votes. 
But the TNI ' s role in Jakarta politics goes much deeper 
than th is. Some politicians seek to curry favour with the 
TN! by proposing that General Wiranto should become 
president or vice-president. Should there be dea~lock over 
who wins the presidency, the likelihood of Wtranto be-
coming president is being widely discussed. 
The TN! has announced that is will abandon practical 
politics, and ties this with its decision to leave GOLKAR. 
This step has obvious consequences but it is too early to 
say how far reaching the effects will be. The TN! is look-
ing for a new political format and the model of Israel or 
Thailand are among the possibilities. In these countries ex 
top army officers automatically play an important role in 
political entities and also go into business. 
The change from Suharto to Habibie went relatively 
smoothly for the simple reason that General Wiranto was 
in charge of the process. He out-manoeuvered army hard-
1 iners, including Lt General ... Prabowo, Suharto' s son-in-
law, proving to be a skilful operator. He has since moved 
cautiously, making him acceptable to most of the TN! 
rank-and-file while at the same time showing a moderate 
image of reform, to nurture his relationship with the main-
stream political parties. 
Habibie is more dependent on Wiranto than the other 
way round. Habibie's transitional presidency could only 
have functioned with the consent of Wiranto and the TN! 
top. Habibie has not got the political clout to dismiss Wi-
ranto or even curb his authority. It is clear that the TNI top 
will play a crucial role in determining the future political 
course, including who will be the next president. 
The president is concurrently the TNI Supreme Com-
mander. In the New Order days, Suharto fulfilled that role 
to excess. In considering the two most likely options, 
Megawati and Habibie, the TN! top would have Jess to 
worry about with Megawati who enjoys a strong popular 
base but is very TNl-friendly. But Habibie has a proven 
working-relationship with the TN! so it could go either 
way. If either bloc can secure only a marginal edge over ' 
the other, the TN! vote will be decisive, making the future 
president a virtual captive of the TN!. * 
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Turmoil in Aceh escalates 
Following a major atrocity in which more than forty people were killed, political turmoil in Aceh has 
continued to escalate. More than a thousand crack troops have been sent in to quell the growing 
movement in support of a referendum and against the 7 June election. Numerous arson attacks have 
been blamed on provocateurs and a number of soldiers have been killed. The heightened military 
presence has caused tens of thousands to flee. Aceh is fast descending into a virtual state of war. 
Since August last year, when 
the Indonesian armed forces 
(formerly called ABRI but now 
known as the TN!) announced the 
lifting of DOM, the designation of 
Aceh as a military operational 
zone, there has been a series of 
atrocities and massacres, each one 
exceeding the previous one in 
brutality and casualties. Unable to 
quell the growing alienation from 
Indonesian rule, the TN! is using 
brute force on an unprecedented 
scale. 
More than forty shot 
dead in cold blood 
The latest atrocity occurred on 
3 May when scores of troops 
opened fire on thousands of people 
in an unprovoked attack. Live 
bullets were used, injuring hun-
dreds more. The anny's claim that 
'only 19' people died and that the ~ 
troops were 'defending them- '---------------------------------
selves' has been debunked by a video film showing the 
massacre in progress. 
The e\i'ents leading up to the 3 May massacre began 
with a peaceful open-air religious gathering to celebrate the 
Muslim new year, Muharram on 30 April in Cut Murong, a 
village in Dewantara sub-district, twelve kilometres west of 
Lhokseumawe, an industrial city which is the capital of 
North Aceh,. Thousands had assembled under the 'Aceh 
Merdeka' slogan in what is known as a Dakwah GAM (the 
initials GAM stand for 'Aceh Freedom Movement'). An 
anny sergeant using a walkie-talkie and armed with a pistol 
was spotted in the crowd and challenged. He was later 
identified as coming from a nearby Guided Missiles De-
tachment, Denruda/, and was almost certainly an intelli-
gence officer. After being questioned by angry villagers, he 
was ordered to leave. The army alleged that he had gone 
missing and launched a huge manhunt, involving hundreds 
of troops including the much-feared mobile police brigade, 
Brimob. 
Refugees from Aceh begging for money and food 
During the two-day search, villages were combed and 
at least twelve civilians were beaten up, requiring medical 
treatment. Angry villagers sought and obtained assurances 
from local civilian and military authorities that the harass-
ment would stop but in fact they intensified. [See for in-
stance the morning edition of the local paper, Waspada ,on 
3 May, which described the atmosphere as 'extremely 
tense' with truckloads of troops patrolling the area.] 
Suspecting that intruders were lurking in the area, many 
villages in the area went on high alert on Sunday evening 
and set up night patrols, fearing that the army would take 
people away in the middle of the night as they had done 
during the dreaded DOM period. 
Early on Monday morning, 3 May, two truckloads of 
troops turned up at the villages of Cut Murong and the 
nearby Lancang Barat but were chased away . Villagers in 
their thousands then started to march towards the military 
headquarters, Korem OJ 1. to express their disappointment 
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that earlier assurances to stop military actions had been 
violated. 
By midday, the crowd had reached an intersecti_o_n in 
front of a factory, Kertas Kraft Aceh, close to the military 
office. Talks were held between leaders of the marchers 
and civilian and military chiefs but as this was in progress, 
more troops arrived. With tempers rising, sOJ~: people in 
the crowd started throwing stones at the military head-
quarters and two motorbikes were set on fire. Then, two 
truckloads of troops turned up from the Guided Missile 
(Arhanud) detachment. 'I saw two Arhanud truck: heavily 
packed with the unit's uniformed personn~l spee?mg fro~n 
behind the army battalion and blindly firing their g~ns ~n 
our direction,' said one eye witness who was recovering m 
hospital from a gunshot wound to t~e b~ck_. [J~k~rta Post, 
11 May] Troops squatting and firmg md1scrnrnnately at 
people fleeing are clearly visible on the film taken by a 
cameraman who happened to be in the vicinity when the 
atrocity occurred. 
The army later claimed that they were returning fi_re 
from the crowd but eye witnesses strongly deny this. 
Seven injured vi~tims interviewed by the press in hospital 
described the army's claim as 'nothing but a lie'. 'In the 
name of Allah we were not there to attack anyone but to 
protect our are~ and our neighbours from any P?ssible at-
tack by the military,' said one victim whose kidney was 
perforated by a bullet. [Jakarta P~st, 11 _ May] Residents 
nearby say that the firing went on_ mterm1ttentl~ for about 
half an hour. The army claimed, without producing a shred 
of evidence, that the Arhanud base was under threat which 
could have caused devastation in nearby build-up areas, 
had the base been blown up. 
Casualties 
By late afternoon, scores of people, many_ a~ready d~ad, 
had been taken to several hospitals and clm1cs; medical 
personnel were overwhelmed and essential medical sup-
plies including blood soon ran out as so many of the 
wounded needed surgery and blood transfusions. 
Surgeons have confirmed that all the dead died fr?m 
gunshot wounds and that live bulle_ts were used, refuting 
army claims about rubber bullets bemg used. Some builets 
have been kept as evidence, while local groups have col-
lected empty bullet shells found at the site of the massacre. 
Many of the dead and injured had multiple gunshot 
wounds. Medical evidence confirmed that many were shot 
in the back, corroborating eye-witness reports that people 
were shot as they fled. 
Among the dead and wounded were young boys and 
girls and a number of women. F_or weeks afterwards, loc~I 
newspapers reported the mounting death toll, as the seri-
ously wounded succumbed. At the last count, forty-one had 
died. 
Calls for an independent investigation into this, Aceh's 
worst ever massacre, have gone unheeded. The army has 
not even set up a military honour council. Yet again, army 
officers have acted with impunity while yet another gross 
human rights violation is added to the n~ver-ending list of 
crimes in Aceh for which the Indonesian army must be 
called to account. In the words of The Jakarta Post, Indo-
nesia's leading English-language daily, 'Killing in '."ceh, it 
appears, is still the order of the day . .. . The promise of a 
full investigation from TNI chief/Minister of Defence _and 
Security, General Wiranto somehow rings _hollow,. smce 
previous fatal incidents have never been sat1sfactor1ly ex-
plained.' [Jakarta Post, 6 May] 
Following the massacre, thousands of villagers, feeling 
very insecure and afraid of what might happen next, left 
home to seek protection elsewhere. 
On 6 May, the security forces shut down eight support 
posts (posko) set up by students near the site of the ma~sa­
cre to monitor the casualties and support the heavily-
traumatised victims and their families .. The district military 
commander. Colonel Johnny Wahab, issued an order for all 
poskos to be shut, describing them as 'centres for provo-
cateurs to meet'. [Suara Pembaruan, 6 May] Students said 
they would ignore the order as there was no one caring for 
the stricken families. 
Wiranto: No DOM investigations 
TNI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto has an-
nounced that investigations into the appalling human rights 
abuses that occurred during the period from 1989 till 1998 
when Aceh was treated as a 'military operational zone' are 
'unnecessary' and could 'open the floodgates for similar 
grievances left over from the Suharto era. 
This betrays a pledge made by President Habibie during 
a visit to Aceh in March this year when he promised that 
these abuses would be investigated and the perpetrators 
brought to justice. Two months later, Justice Minister Mu-
ladi follow this up by saying the President had agreed to set 
up an independent committee to investigate human rights 
violations in Aceh. 
Speaking at a meeting of a parliamentary commission, 
Wiranto said that it was 'the consensus of the government 
and the National Commission of Human Rights that the 
teams' subjects of investigation would only be right viola-
tion cases that occurred over the past year'. 
But this was den.ied by Commission's chairman Mar-
zuki Darusman, who said the Commission's position was 
that alleged abuses committed in the past year should be 
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· investigated first but 'there is no limitation whatsoever in 
the (proposed) investigation'. 
Acehnese leaders have said that mounting calls for a 
referendum to determine whether Acehnese want to remain 
part of Indonesia stem from the government's failure to 
settle injustices committed during those military opera-
tions. 
Wiranto also said it would be 'unfair' to investigate 
only those cases in which civilians were killed during the 
Suharto period when numerous servicemen also lost their 
lives. 'Technically, it would be quite difficult to prove the 
alleged killings and seek those involved,' according to Wi-
ranto. 
More troops pour in 
With anti-military sentiments reaching new heights, Ja-
karta's answer to the crisis has not been to scale down the 
military presence. On the contrary, five days after the trag-
edy, the TNI commander-in..:chief, General Wiranto an-
nounced that crack units composed largely of Brimob 
troops would be sent to Aceh 'to safeguard the general 
election'. A new force of combined, crack anti-disorder 
troops called Pasukan Penindak Rusuh Massa (PPRM), 
Operational Troops for Mass Revolt, composed of Brimob, 
(police commandos) and army special troops have been 
sent to Aceh. Four hundred and fifty PPRMtroops arrived 
within a week of the tragedy but today, more than 1,200 of 
these special forces are terrorising the population with their 
continual operations. The task of the PPRMforces in Aceh 
is to cope with a population in open peaceful revolt against 
rule from Jakarta;, this involved doing everything to force 
people to vote, dealing with peaceful demonstrations, using 
provocateurs to stir up trouble, as well as engaging in 
armed conflict with GAM guerrillas who are operating 
again in Aceh. 
Security in Aceh is now fully in the hands of the mili-
tary with special forces playing the dominant role, as they 
did for ten years starting 1989 during the period known as 
DOM. The TNI chief of general staff. General Sugiono, 
made the aim clear when he said: ' We will hang on to 
Aceh, come what may'. [Waspada, 3 June] He also admit-
ted that the resumption of DOM was under consideration. 
As a sign of further possible troop reinforcements be-
ing sent to Aceh, the chief of staff of the Army Strategic 
Command, KOSTRAD, Major-General Williem da Costa 
announced that two rapid deployment battalions were on 
call, ready to be deployed in Aceh where, he admitted , the 
situation was now very serious. [Jawa Pas, 12 June] 
No interest in the elections 
In at least two districts of Aceh, Pidie and North Aceh, 
the 7 June general election was a complete flop as so few 
people turned up to vote. Plans to hold the election after a 
delay of a few weeks had to be abandoned. 
Tens of thousands flee their homes 
For months now, tens of thousands of Acehnese villag-
ers have been fleeing their homes and seeking sanctuary in 
mosques, schools and other public buildings. These mass 
exoduses occur every time PPRM troops go out on opera-
tions in any region of the province. This has created a ma-
jor humanitarian problem in Aceh as locations where they 
seek refuge lack all the basic facilities, clean water, food, 
medical facilities and proper sanitation. 
In every case, the villagers say that the very appearance 
of soldiers strikes fear, especially if, as always happens, the 
troops start carrying out house to house searches. They 
frequently loot people ' s belongings and manhandle anyone 
who offers the least resistance. 
Acehnese people have still not got over the trauma 
through which 1hey lived for a decade up to 1998 when the 
region was treated as a 'military operational zone ' or 
DOM. This resulted in thousands of deaths and disappear-
ances, torture and rape. During the latter months of 1998, 
Aceh was overwhelmed by the discovery of mass graves 
and hundreds of people came forward to describe the terror 
to which they were subjected under DOM. Although DOM 
was lifted in August last year, no one has been brought to 
justice for the crimes committed. Worse still, new atrocities 
have been perpetrated, such as the one reported above. A 11 
this has left a residue of profound hatred for the Indonesian 
armed forces and the very appearance ·of troops sends vil-
lagers fleeing. In many cases, they abandon coffee and rice 
crops ready to harvest and leave their cattle unattended. 
There have been reports of people who are fleeing be-
ing set upon by troops obstructing their passage, comman-
deering their vehicles and trying to force them to return 
home. 
In early July, military operations in the sub-district of 
Tangse in Pidie resulted in the villagers from all the 29 
villages fleeing their homes and leaving the district entirely 
deserted. 
Wiranto hides the truth 
In an attempt to smother the truth about the new wave 
of terror engulfing Aceh, armed forces commander in 
chief, General Wiranto claimed that it was untrue to say 
that it was the presence of troops that was causing people 
to flee in Aceh. 'The TNI has never oppressed the 
Acehnese. All the pressure comes from the rebel gangs,' 
he alleged . ' The army never harms people or loots their 
property.' [Media Indonesia, 30 June] 
The armed forces chief was clearly stung by reports in 
the press that the governor of Aceh, Syamsuddin Mahmud. 
had warned told President Habibie that 'the trauma of a 
decade-long military operation in Aceh was so deep that 
many Acehnese fled the presence of security forces· 
[Jakarta Post, 30 June] 
The only person to challenge Wiranto's perversion of 
the truth was Munir, head of KONTRAS. the Commission 
for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, who wrote in 
protest to Wiranto, saying: 'It is absolutely clear that the 
TN! is using violence. This is what is causing the Acehnese 
people to flee. As long as things go on like this. the prob-
lems in Aceh will never be solved,· said Munir. He called 
on the TNI and the government to withdraw all the troop 
reinforcements sent to Aceh and for an end to all military 
operations in the province. [Jmrn Pos. 2 July] • 
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Truth about Biak atrocity revealed 
The truth about the atrocity perpetrated by the Indonesian security forces when they attacked a 
peaceful crowd which had unfurled the West Papuan flag in Biak in July last year has now been re-
vealed in a report published by a human rights organisation in Jayapura in July 1999. The report 
was prepared in collaboration with three Churches - two Protestant and one Catholic - which have 
large congregations in West Papua. 
The report, entitled 'Graves without Names, Names 
Without Graves: Report on Human Rights Abuses in Biak, 
lrian Jaya ' stresses that human rights abuses have contin-
ued into the era of 'reformasi', following the downfall of 
Suharto in May last year. 
The armed attack on unarmed civilians in Biak in July 
last year was in violation of the Right to Free Expression 
and the Right to Self-Determination as established in the 
UN Charter and various UN covenants. From July till Oc-
tober 1998, the Morning Star Flag (Bintang Kejora) was 
unfurled in several places to protest at the way West Papua 
had been incorporated into Indonesia in the 1960s. The 
actions were also in protest at numerous abuses over the 
past thirty years which were clearly fall into the category of 
crimes against humanity. 
In a Summary of the Report made available at a press 
conference in Jayapura, it was stated that the 'Morning 
Star' FJag was unfurled atop a 35-metre tall water-tower in 
Biak harbour, supported by a crowd of between 500 and 
1,000 people. However, the Indonesian authorities branded 
this as a separatist action, warranting a violent response. 
The hundreds of demonstrators were encircled and fired on 
early on the morning of 6 July . Residents in the neighbour-
hoods of Pnas, Wapnor and Saramon, in Biak City District 
were rounded up and driven to the harbour area where they 
were ill-treated and tortured. Hundreds of people were ar-
rested and ill-treated, dozens sustained gunshot wounds 
and were driven by military trucks to two hospitals where 
they received inadequate medical care. 
The bodies of six of those who died have still not been 
returned to their families; the authorities say they were 
' dispensed of' in the sea. Given the intimidation to which 
the local population was subjected, it has been extremely 
difficult for concerned groups to conduct thorough investi-
gations. 
The atmosphere worsened when dozens of ' mysterious 
corpses' were washed ashore in Biak shortly after the Biak 
tragedy. Without permitted autopsies, the government and 
the armed forces claimed that they were victims of the tsu-
nami disaster that struck Aitape in Papua New Guinea on 
17 July. 
But Johanes Bonay of ELS-HAM, speaking at the 
press conference, said signs of torture were found on the 
bodies. One body was clad in the uniform of an Indonesian 
high school association and another in a Golkar shirt This 
made a nonsense of the army's claim that the corpses were 
victims of the tsunami which happened on 17 July, eight 
days after the bodies were washed ashore. And anyway, he 
asked, 'do Papua New Guineans wear Golkar or Indone-
sian student group T-shirts?' 
According to ELS-HAM IRJA. the Human Rights Study 
and Advocacy Institute of Irian Jaya which published the 
report, the casualties of the Biak tragedy were: 
• Eight dead. Six of the bodies have never been re-
covered while the other two were not given proper 
medical care. 
• Three people disappeared. 
• Four people who suffered gunshot wounds have 
been crippled for life. 
• Thirty-three persons were wounded and not given 
proper medical care. 
• Hundred of local residents were driven from their 
homes at crack of dawn, forced to stand i·n the sun 
for hours, kicked and beaten by troops, photo-
graphed, finger-printed and interrogated at the local 
police station. 
• 150 people were taken into custody; nineteen were 
tried and sentenced. Fifteen have since been released 
after serving sentences while three are still serving 
sentences in Biak Prison. 
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• Filep Jacob Semuel Karma who was accused of be-
ing the ring-leader of the flag incident is in Adepura 
Prison with an appeal to the Supreme Court against 
his sentence still pending. 
Meanwhile, one student, Steven Suripati, was fatally 
wounded when security forces violently broke up a student 
protest in Jayapura on 3 July 1998. A schoolgirl had her 
legs smashed and is now paralysed. There were also arrests 
in Wamena and Manokwari following flag-raising protests. 
Bonay warned that more Papuans would raise inde-
pendence flag to express their disappointment with the 
central government and their powerlessness to cope with 
suffering and the resolution of their grievances. 
'The move reflects the people's protest against the gov-
ernment, which they said has never heeded their aspira-
tions.' 
Redress demanded 
ELS-HAM and the three Churches called for an inde-
pendent, international investigation into the Biak tragedy 
which should include the . Indonesian, Australian, and 
Papua New Guinea governments, as well as Amnesty In-
ternational, Human Rights Watch and the Robery F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Centre for Human Rights. 
They also called for a transparent and independent investi-
gations of the numerous abuses that have occurred in Irian 
Jaya over the past 36 years of integration with Indonesia 
and for the findings to be made public. They called for a 
reversal of the decision to place troops in Irian Jaya as a so-
called 'politically volatile region'. All political detainees 
and convicted political prisoners held in connection with 
WEST PAPUA 
incidents in Biak, Wamena, Manokwari, Sorong, Jaya-
pura and elsewhere should be released. There should 
be an end to acts of violence which tend to be racist as 
well. A second national dialogue about the future status of 
Irian Jaya, following talks earlier this year with President 
Habibie, should be held so as to find a solution to many 
problems and ensure a more just and humane future for the 
people. They also called on the government to abandon 
plans to split lrian Jaya into three provinces, saying that 
there should first be a dialogue with the people on the 
matter. 
Flag-raising in Sorong 
A crowd of about several hundred people unfurled the 
West Papuan flag in the town of Sarong on 6 July this year. 
Police quickly appeared, pulled the flag down and opened 
fire causing the people to disperse. One man was seriously 
injured and others were wounded. The man was later said 
to be under intensive care in hospital. Over forty people 
were rounded up and taken into custody. 
Following the gunfire, many people, angered at the way 
the police had desecrated their flag, went on the rampage. 
One man driving a local taxi was killed. The incident 
caused tension in the city, with many shops closing down. 
The following day, a woman named Yacomina Isir, was 
arrested by the police and accused of organising the flag-
raising. Yacomina is the head of the Irian Jaya students' 
association. She is one of seventeen people being held by 
the police in connection with the incident. [AFP, 8 July] * 
Joint SAS-Kopassus hostage operation 
Revelations that SAS officer~ from Britain and mercenaries from South Africa were involved in an 
operation to rescue foreign scientists taken hostage by the OPM in 1996 are contained in a docu-
mentary shown on Australian television on 12 July. The film also revealed that villagers were shot 
dead by white men transported by a helicopter with International Red Cross markings. Reports that 
SAS officers were involved were vehemently denied at the time by the British Foreign Office. 
The hostages were taken captive by the Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka (OPM) in January 1996 and held until 
their rescue on 21 May. The OPM were trying to draw in-
ternational attention to their much-neglected struggle for 
independence. The hostages included four British scientists 
from Cambridge University, a Dutch couple and four Indo-
nesian scientists. As the group were being rescued, two 
Indonesian hostages were hacked to death. This has always 
been blamed on members of the OPM, but the documen-
tary presents a very different account. 
Blood on the Cross 
The events surrounding the rescue and the killing of 
villagers occurred as negotiations between the hostage-
takers and the International Red Cross (ICRC) broke down 
on 8 May. OPM leader Kelly Kwalik changed his mind 
about releasing the hostages for reasons that are still un-
clear. The ICRC which had been making frequent heli-
copter flights bringing supplies to the hostages and to meet 
their captors, decided to discontinue its efforts and its chief 
of mission returned to Jakarta. Reports that a plane with 
ICRC markings landed in the village of Geselama, and that 
white soldiers opened fire on unsuspecting villagers. killing 
many people. are now confirmed .. 
The documentary. entitled Blood on the Cross. was 
broadcast by Four Corners. It reveals that the rescue op-
eration involved members of the British crack regiment. 
SAS and mercenaries from the South Africa-based com-
pany. Executive Outcomes. The SAS officers were hos-
tage-rescue experts who trained Indonesian commandos in 
the use of high-tech equipment to track down the hostages; 
This equipment which was said. at the time. to have come 
from Singapore, consisted of a 'drone', a small unmanned 
aircraft with heat-sensory devices. 
Most of the mercenaries employed by EO and the 
other well-known mercenary company. Sandline. whose 
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operations in Papua New Guinea caused such a scandal 
that the Julius Chan government was forced to resign, are 
former SAS soldiers. Their inclusion in an SAS operation 
is almost automatic. Their main role would probably be to 
handle 'front line' duties, such as gunning down villagers 
in Geselama. Had an SAS sold ier been caught doing such a 
thing, it would have been disastrous for the British gov-
ernment. 
Major General Prabowo (left) in better days, here with Gen-
ral Wiranto. At present Prabowo lives in exile in Jordan. 
Following the screening of the film, the Foreign Office 
again denied SAS involvement in the operation, but the 
London Times was told by authoritative sources close to 
the regiment that four to six of its members had indeed 
participated. [The Times, 13 July 1999] 
The British embassy in Jakarta appointed its military 
attache, Ivor Helberg, a former SAS colonel, to provide 
specialised assistance and advice to Major-General 
Prabowo, then commander of Kopassus, the Indonesian 
elite commandos who got all the credit for the rescue op-
eration. At the time, the British Government insisted that 
only Scotland Yard detectives were sent to Irian Jaya to 
give advice on how to negotiate with the kidnappers. TA-
POL 's Carmel Budiardjo was repeatedly told by Foreign 
Office officials that the British Government was urging the 
Indonesians not to mount a military operation to rescue the 
hostages, for fear of endangering their lives. It now 
emerges that this is precisely what the British Government 
itself was doing, placing their own citizens at risk; 
Villagers gunned down 
On the day that the hostages were taken away from Ge-
selama village where they were supposed to have been re-
leased, a helicopter with ICRC markings landed on a 
clearing in the village. Thinking this was the JCRC, viJJag-
ers approached the heli and were gunned down by men 
who alighted; number of villagers were killed. At the time, 
T APOL received several reports about these killings: one 
gave the names of seven villagers who were killed, while 
another gave a much higher death toll. 
Some of the hostages later said that after leaving their 
camp in Geselama, they heard shooting, explosions, 
(possibly hand-grenades) and saw a great deal of gunfire 
smoke. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 135, June 1996. Much 
of what we reported in that issue is now confirmed by the 
Four Corners documentary.] 
One of the hostages, Daniel Start, . interviewed by Mark 
Davis who made the documentary, said that the murdered 
villagers had been lured to. their deaths by the ICRC flag 
and gunned down by four or five white people, with Indo-
nesians behind them. He said that eight people were killed 
and many wounded. He also said that the two Indonesians 
hacked to death were killed by the grieving civilian friends 
and relatives of innocent people_ ' murdered days before 
under extraordinary circumstances '. [See AFP 's account of 
the documentary, 13 July] 
The ICRC denied that it had authorised the use of one 
of its helicopters but failed to investigate reports which 
were circulating widely at the time that its helicopter had 
been used in this way. TAPOL which monitored the ~vents 
surrounding the hostage crisis almost daily, warned at the 
time that the ICRC was becoming too closely associated 
with the Indonesian military, compromising its neutral 
stance. 
Crackdown follows hostage crisis 
Once the hostages had been released and had flown 
home, the British government lost interest in the area and 
in the fate of the local people who became the victims of 
the crackdown that followed in the wake of the hostages' 
release. The hostage crisis and the combined SAS-
Kopassus military operation left the area in the grip of 
military control , forcing villagers to flee their homes and 
gardens. A wave of killings took place as revealed several 
years later in a report published by the Catholic and Prot-
estant Churches in Mimika. The atrocities were concen-
trated in the villages of Bela, Alama, Jila, Mapnduma and 
Geselama, the region where the hostage crisis unfolded. As 
a result of military operations which continued for several 
years, eleven people were killed and many more wounded, 
while scores of people died from hunger and disease, be-
cause they lost control of their gardens and hunting 
grounds. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 147, July 1998] * 
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countries around the world, including my own.' A State 
Department official, James Foley said they had made it 
'unmistakably clear' that 'the actions of the militias . . . are 
unacceptable'. 
Other governments have been less forthcoming. The 
British Foreign Office did summon the Indonesian ambas-
sador to deliver a reprimand but public statements are not 
the British style, nor has the European Union made its 
views known on the latest developments. 
As we go to press, it remains to be seen whether the 
hardliners backing the militia and the violence-related 
strategy in East Timor will be forced into a climbdown, 
whether the militias will be disarmed and disbanded, the 
tens of thousands of refugees will be free to return home, in 
short whether the secure environment necessary for the 
Referendum will be created. * 
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Pramoedya warmly welcomed everywhere 
Indonesia's most celebrated writer, Pramoedya Anania Toer who spent 14 years in detention has just 
completed a visit to the US, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany and France. He received several 
awards, including a doctorate from the University in Michigan, Ann Arbor and the Chevalier 
d'Ordre des Arts des Lettres from the French Government. Pram was accompanied by his wife 
Maemunah and his publisher andfriend Joesoef Isak, like Pram an ex-prisoner of the Suharto era. 
Pram's works which have been translated in all the 
major languages are read in all the corners of the earth. The 
74-year-old author has a powerful personality and holds 
strong political views which is what made him such a thorn 
in the flesh for the Suharto regime. 
He was arrested within days of Suharto's seizure of 
power. His huge collection of documents was confiscated, 
a major tragedy not only for him personally but for anyone 
interested in Indonesian history, and his house was seized. 
He was among the first batch of untried political prisoners 
to be sent to the notorious prison island of Buru in 1969. 
He became Indonesia' s best known political prisoner, a 
constant embarrassment for the military. Among the last to 
be released, he returned to Jakarta in 1979. but like all the 
hundreds of thousands of ex-political prisoners, he re-
mained a virtual prisoner in the big jail called Indonesia. 
The ex-political prisoners were stripped of their basic 
civil rights. Restrictions were imposed; they were required 
to report regularly and were .banned from leaving the 
places where they lived without special permission. 
He continued to write on Buru 
Long before Suharto took power. Pram was one of In-
donesia's most celebrated writers. He had the tenacity, un-
der appalling conditions in Buru to write a tetralogy. The 
first volume called Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind) 
became a blockbuster and brought Pram international rec-
ognition and nomination for the Nobel Prize for Literature . 
Pram 's works are widely available abroad but are still 
banned in Indonesia. However. one of the best-kno\\ n 
book shops in Jakarta. close to the National Parliament. has 
his works prominently displayed on their bookshelves. It is 
surely only a matter of time before the post-Suharto 
authorities will decide to lift this ridiculous ban. 
Pram has been invited to travel abroad many times but 
until now, he always refused. He was afraid that he \votlld 
end up like Solzhenitsjin. who was not allowed to return 
home by the Soviet authorities . But the invitation this time 
came from his US publisher. for a nation-wide launch 0f 
his Buru island memoirs. The Mule's So/iloq1~' " This was 
also an opportunity for several universities in the US to 
give him awards. including the University of California in 
Los Angeles. 
Everywhere. Pram addressed packed halls. Hundreds of 
people turned up to listen to Pram. novelist. political activ-
ist and ex-political prisoner. For the first time, Pram met 
his international readership and he was very moved by the 
enthusiasm he experienced in all the countries he visited. 
More invitations are likely, from Germany to attend the 
Frankfurt Book Fair, for a book launch in Norway, and a 
visit to the UK. 
Pramoedya i11 tire .\'etlrerla11ds 
Pram really deserves this kind of international acclaim . 
His consistent opposition to the Suharto dictatorship has 
inspired many of the young generation in Indonesia. But 
many Indonesian intellectuals dislike Pram because hi s 
strong 'iews reflect their own cowardice. During the Su-
~ ~ 
hai10 years. \ery fe\\ intellectuals dared to speal.. out. Pram 
often uses the term tiarap lface flat on the gwund) to de- . 
scribe the mentality of most Indonesians during the \le\\ 
Order dictatorship. ~ 
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Putting Suharto on trial 
Pram gave a short interview to TAPOL in Holland, the 
day before he left for Indonesia. 
You are now reaching the end of a 3-month trip 
abroad, when you visited the US, Canada, Holland, Ger-
many and France. This was your first trip abroad since 
you were released from prison in the late seventies. What 
are your first impressions, having met so many fans and 
readers from different parts of the world ? 
I was really surprised to receive such a warm and en-
thusiastic welcome during this entire trip. I never expected 
that my works had such a large audience. 
During your travels did you ever face problems with 
the Indonesian authorities or did you feel at ease ? 
As far as I could see, there was no hassle at all from the 
authorities. That's why I see my journey abroad as a vic-
tory for me against Indonesian fascism and militarism. As 
you know, in my case, the ban on my going abroad has not 
yet been lifted. And my books are still officially black-
listed. 
This victory was also thanks to the achievements of the 
younger generation who overthrew Suharto. The fact that 
the invitation came from the US was important because the 
US authorities gave me a five-year multiple entry visa 
without any fuss. 
Bung Pram, I want to raise with you one stumbling 
block in history. We are approaching a new millennium. 
During the present century, we have faced huge human 
tragedies, two world wars, the Holocaust and so many 
other horrors. It is a bitter fact that the international 
community has taken no moves to place Suharto in the 
same category as Hitler, Pol Pot and other gross perpe-
trators of crimes against humanity. Can you comment on 
this? 
Yes, it is indeed bitter. When human tragedies occur, 
causing many victims, an international commission is im-
mediately set up to start an inquiry. But it is different with 
Indones!a. The overthrow fall of Sukarno was the result of 
a _co_nspiracy bet~een multinational capital and a wing 
withi~ the Indonesian army. The aim of the conspiracy was 
to seize c~ntrol of Indonesia's abundant riches, including 
the use of its cheap labour force. These economic interests 
created a political atmosphere in which mass killings and 
gross human rights violations were completely ignored. 
This had huge consequences for Indonesia. A power 
was erected based on fear and terror. The Indonesian men-
tality became one of tiarap (lying flat on the floor) to the 
extent that many Indonesians became hypocritical, in par-
ticular people within the bureaucracy, whose duty it was to 
obey and serve the wishes of Suharto. This kind of mental-
ity continues to this very day. Even in this post-Suharto 
era, there has been no official pressure to put him on trial 
because all those who are in charge of the legal procedures 
are his cronies. They have all been involved in the crimes 
a~a~nst h~ma~ity for which Suharto is guilty, including 
kilhng, v10Iation of human rights, the looting of Indone-
sia's resources and the exploitation of cheap Indonesian 
labour. It is difficult to imagine that a trial against Suharto 
could take place in Indonesia. 
Let 's hope it 's a case of better late than never. Suharto 
is still alive and the international community is finding 
legal means to pursue people like Suharto. What are your 
concrete suggestions for people at home and abroad to · 
make sure that a trial of Suharto actually happens? 
I believe there are major obstacles. He still enjoys pro-
tection from multinational capital. In this period of history, 
victory is in the hands of capitalism to such an extent that 
capitalism has created the term globalisation. This is a 
major problem. Multinational capital is protecting their 
partner in the conspiracy. It is inde€d paramount for inter-
national public opinion to step up pressure - even though 
there are limits to what can be achieved. 
During my visit to Washington D.C. I said that condi-
tions inside Indonesia make it impossible to put Suharto on 
trial there because all his cronies. are still in power. The 
only possibility would. be to take him abroad by force .and 
put him on trial in another country but it is difficult to 
imagine which country would be willing to do this. Who 
knows, when East Timor becomes independent, he can be 
taken to East Timor. That would be the simplest way. 
The international human rights community had made 
an unprecedented leap forward with the Pinochet affair. 
We need to find international legal loopholes to prosecute 
Suharto. It is really terrible to think that one of the twen-
tieth century's worst human rights perpetrators can still 
walk freely on this earth. 
That's the whole point. The killings that started with 
Suharto's Orde Baru are being continued by the OrBaba 
(the new Orde Baru). And the tools being used to carry out 
these killings still originate from the North. They have be-
come accomplices in the killings. Practically all the coun-
tries in the North are involved in weapon deliveries for the 
mass killings and human rights violations, and peaceful 
demonstrators being beaten up by security officers. The 
solution still seems to be far off. The best solution would 
be for East Timor to become independent and grab hold of 
Suharto. I don't know what means we can use. The people 
of East Timor are the ones to have been the worst affected 
by Suharto's crimes. 
Yes, that's true. Every Timorese family has lost loved· 
ones during the Indonesian occupation, victims of the 
Suharto regime. 
_I have oft~n quoted Sukarno as saying that humanity is 
~mversal: T?ts means that everybody on this globe has the 
ngh~ to mdtct Suharto because of his crimes against hu-
manity. But does the international community care enough 
to start investigating him?. That's the problem. 
Bung Pram, thank you so much ! 
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1965 massacre: Suharto .must be indicted 
A former political prisoner who spent 20 years in prison is spearheading investigations into the mas-
sacre of hundreds of thousands of people in 196511966 after Suharto seized power. The massacres 
were directed against the Indonesian Communist Party and led to its physical and political annihila-
tion. In Australia, new evidence has come to light showing that the government there received de-
tailed, up-to-date reports as the massacre proceeded, but did nothing to stop the killings. 
A woman now in her seventies is devoting the remain-
ing years of her life t-0 investigating the massacres that 
swept across in Indonesia within days of General Suharto 
seizing power in October 1965. Sulami was deputy secre-
tary-general of the women's organisation, GERWANI 
which was outlawed in 1965. She is one of a group of for-
mer political prisoner?who have set up the Indonesian In-
stitute for the Study of the 1965/1966 Massacre and is her-
self working with people in Central Java to exhume the 
bodies of the victims of the massacre. 
Sulami is the focus of a documentary screened in Aus-
tralia last August by Mike Carey on Dateline, entitled: 
'Indonesia's Killing Fields'. The film is a damning expo-
sure of Suharto's role in the killings and provides plenty of 
evidence for Indonesia's former dictator to be indicted for 
crimes against humanity. 
The film interviews people who took part in the death 
squads, Muslim leaders who studied Hitler's Mein Kampf 
for advice on what to do,, and an army officer who boasts 
of his role in 'cleaning up' the communists. 
Suharto must be tried 
Sulami speaks of her determination to push for Suharto 
to be tried .for crimes against humanity because of the cam-
paign of slaughter which he organised in 1965 to destroy 
the PKI which was then a major political force in Indone-
sia. 
The film identifies two army officers who played a 
leading, personal role in the killings. One of them, Sarwo 
Edhie, is now dead. The other Kemal Idris, now a member 
of the National Front (Barison National) which brings to-
gether a number of retired army officers, makes no secret 
of the role he played in killing communists, on instructions 
from Suharto, then a major-general in command of KOS-
TRAD, the army's Strategic Command. He said: 
We were given the task to clean up the PK! in West 
Java and Central Java .. So I went to every part to clean the 
PK! up. It was very quick, very clean. By the end of 1965, 
their movement was not active any more. 
Among the several Muslim leaders interviewed who 
were complicit in the massacres was Jusuf Hasjim of the 
Nahdlatul Ulama, who recently set up a political party to 
contest the recent elections. He first explained how Muslim 
landlords had been the target of land seizures by peasants 
in the 1960s. He was at the time a leader of the NU's youth 
organisation Ansor and decided that action had to be taken 
against the mass organisations affiliated to the PKI, the 
youth organisation Pemuda Rakjat, GERWANI, and the 
peasants' union, BT/. 
To resist their pressure, we needed to set up a youth or-
ganisation. In order to do this, we studied Mein Kampf by 
Hitler, to learn how he set up his youth organisation. We 
set up Banser which would fu.nction a bit like the military. 
It got military training. All this was done with the knowl-
edge of the military although they pretended that they 
didn 't know anything. 
Abdurrahman Wahid, chairman of the NU, has a very 
different view of the tragedy. Interviewed towards the end, 
he says that justice must be done, adding that people know 
that it was Suharto who was involved in the killing of the 
six generals, the event that later became known as the 
G30S and was blamed on the PKI as justification for 
slaughtering so many hundreds of thousands of people. 
There are moving shots of Sulami and her colleagues 
digging in places where scores of people are known to 
have been slain. Holding part of a human skeleton, Sulami 
speaks of her determination to have Suharto indicted. • 
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Police open fire on demonstrators 
Shots rang out in Jakarta on 1 July as demonstrators tried to enter the Elections Commission office 
during a protest organised by the PRD. More than twenty people were rushed to hospital, some suf-
fering from gunshot wounds. Following widespread condemnation ·of this use of brute force, the 
PRD labour activist, Dita lndah Sari was suddenly released. Meanwhile, human rights activists say 
police behaviour has not changed since the force was separated from the armed forces. 
The demonstration outside the office of the General 
Election Committee (KPU) was in protest against irregu-
larities during the elections on 7 June by the former ruling 
party GOLKAR. The demonstrators wanted to meet KPU 
members to demand that GOLKAR be disqualified from the 
election. 
Shot from behind 
·The demonstration started as a peaceful rally of hun-
dreds of members of the PRD, the People's Democratic 
Party, through Jakarta. On its way, the size swelled with 
hundreds more joining in. The demonstrators were also 
calling for an end to the Indonesian army's dwifungsi, or 
dual function, giving it a dominant role in political life. 
When the crowd reached the KPU office, they were 
confronted by about fifty police who were armed with ri-
fles, pistols, bamboo clubs and tear gas grenades. The 
crowd was addressed by PRO activists, including Andi 
Arief, who was abducted by Kopassus forces shortly be-
fore the downfall of Suharto, and Hendri Kuok who is the 
party's representative on the KPU. 
Leaders asked KPU officials for the crowd to be al-
lowed to enter the building to meet members of the Com-
mittee but were told only a few dozen would be allowed in, 
The crowd rejected this and decided to stage a sit-in inside 
the building. As they moved towards the entrance, police 
opened fire without warning, shooting plastic bullets at 
point-blank range. Several people were hit while others 
were beaten up, also sustaining serious injuries. The crowd 
quickly dispersed but even as they were fleeing, the 
shooting continued, with some being hit from behind. 
Those who fled found their path blocked by eight truck-
loads of Brimob (police commando) troops. 
In all, more that one hundred people were wounded in 
the initial shooting and the fracas which followed. The 
most seriously injured was a PRO member standing in the 
front line. Dytha Caturani was pulled behind the police 
line, shot in the back and brutally beaten while lying on the 
ground. She sustained severe injuries to the face and head 
from police jackboots. Others who were also hospitalised 
required operations to remove bullets. At least seven of the 
wounded had sustained gunshot wounds. 
Dita lndah Sari released 
Four days after the brutal attack on the PRO rally, one 
of its best known activists was suddenly released from 
prison. It is widely believed that her unexpected release 
was in response to the outcry that followed the police at-
tack on the PRD' s rally. There had also been many work-
ers' demonstrations outside the prfson where she was being 
held, calling for her release. There has also been strong 
international pressure from trade unions and from Amnesty 
International, calling for her release. 
Dita Sari who chaired the party's trade union centre, the 
PPB! (Indonesian Center for Workers' Struggle) had been 
held for more than two years in Tangerang Prison, West 
Java. She was arrested in June 1996 following a huge 
workers ' action in Surabaya, East Java. Along with other 
PRO leaders, she was later tried and sentenced to five 
years. 
In December last year, Dita Sari was told that she could 
be released on condition that she undertook not to engage 
in any political activities, an offer which she refused. In 
June this year, workers' committees from several regions 
in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi formed a new workers' or-
ganisation, the FNPBI (National Front for the Struggle of 
the Indonesian Working Class) which elected Dita Sari to 
chair the organisation in recognition for her consistency in 
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